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STATE TAX COMMISSION OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondents, 
vs. 
ARCHIE L. LARSEN and LEE H. 
WHITLOCK, a partnership, 
Defendants, 
LEE H. vVHITLOCK, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
6240 
Appellant in his brief has stated the facts, and re-
spondent will endeavor to avoid unnecessary repetition 
of the same. However, in order to lay a factual founda-
tion to our legal argument, we will here set forth that 
portion of the facts we believe pertinent to this contro-
versy. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A complaint was filed in the Fourth Judicial Dis-
trict Court by the State Tax Commission against Archie 
L. Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, a partnership, alleging 
sales tax liability. In furtherance of said action, a sum-
mons was prepared by respondent and given to the 
Sheriff of Salt Lake County for service. On the 24th day 
of December, 1936, the original of the said summons, to-
gether with a certificate, duly executed and certified by 
a deputy sheriff, was returned and filed with the clerk of 
the court in Duchesne County. The certificate of the 
sheriff certified that he had served the summons, to-
gether with a copy of the complaint, upon Lee H. Whit-
lock personally on the 17th day of December, 1936. Lee 
H. Whitlock failed to answer the complaint of the re-
spondent or otherwise plead, and on the 8th day of March, 
1938, the default of Lee H. Whitlock was duly entered 
by the clerk of the said court. On the 9th day of March, 
1938, the Honorable Dallas H. Young rendered judgment 
in favor of respondent and against appellant, Lee H. 
Whitlock. In the judgment the court found Archie L. 
Larsen and Lee H. Whitlock, individually, had been reg-
ularly served with process and had defaulted. On the 
8th day of l\1arch, 1939, Lee H. Whitlock, by and through 
his attorneys, Moyle and l\ioyle, filed the following mo-
tion: 
"Now comes the defendant, Lee II. Whitlock, 
by Moyle & Moyle, his attorneys, appearing here 
specially for the purposes of this motion only, and 
moves the court to vacate, set aside and quash the 
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alleged or pretended service of summons upon this 
defendant for the reason that summons in the 
above entitled cause has never been served upon 
this defendant. 
''This motion is based upon the files and 
records of said action and the proceedings therein 
and upon the affidavit attached hereto, which affi-
davit is hereby referred to and made a part hereof. 
''Please govern yourself accordingly. 
(Signed) MOYLE & MOYLE, 
Attorneys for Defendant Lee 
H. Whitlock, for the purpose of 
this motion only. 
STATE OF UTAH l 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ss. 
"0. vV. MOYLE, JR., being first duly sworn, 
upon oath deposes and certifies that he is one of 
the attorneys for the defendant, Lee H. Whitlock, 
for the purpose of the above motion only; that in 
his opinion the objection to the pretended service 
of summons upon said defendant as set forth in 
the above motion is well taken. 
(Signed) 0. W. MOYLE, JR. 
''Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8th 
day of March, 1939. 
(SEAL) 
(Signed) DAN T. MOYLE, 
Notary Public, residing at 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
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''Received copy of the above motion, together 
with the attached affidavit, this 8th day of March, 
1939. 
(Signed) ALFRED KLEIN, 
Attorney for the State Tax 
Commission of the State of 
Utah.'' 
(Italics ours.) 
This motion was supported by an affidavit filed hy 
Mr. Whitlock. The motion was filed in the District Court 
at Duchesne County on the 8th day of March, 1939. On 
the day set for hearing of the said motion, respondent 
appeared through its attorney and objected to the motion 
on the ground that such a motion would not properly lie 
after judgment and, hence, any evidence in support of 
the motion was irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial. 
The Honorable Abe W. Turner, Judge of the Fourth Ju-
dicial District Court, before whom the matter was heard, 
deferred ruling upon this objection and received the evi-
dence introduced by the appellant. The admissibility of 
the evidence was, of course, conditioned upon the ruling 
on the objections interposed by the Tax Commission. The 
Tax Commission, in turn, refused to submit any evi-
dence, electing to stand upon its position that the motion 
was entirely out of order and any evidence in support or 
denial thereof was irrelevant. Judge Turner requested 
briefs supporting the positions of the respective parties 
regarding the efficacy of the motion. The briefs were 
duly submitted~ and the court, on the 24th day of June, 
1939, denied the motion. It is from the denial of this 
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motion that the appellant, Lee H. Whitlock, instituted this 
appeal. 
Questions 
As analyzed by respondent, there are two questions 
presented to the Court by this appeal: 
1. Is the order denying a restrictive motion to 
quash service of summons an appealable or-
der? 
2. Will a motion restricting itself to the sole pur-
pose of quashing service of summons properly 
lie after judgment? · 
Argument 
In presenting its negative answers to the two ques-
tions, respondent will divide its argument into the follow-
ing subheads : 
A. The denial by the district court of appellant's 
restrictive motion to quash service of summons 
is not a final judgment for the purpose of 
appeal. 
B. Appellant's restrictive motion to quash service 
of summons, made after judgment, precluded 
respondent from defending its judgment. 
C. The dh;trict court, regardless of objections by 
respondent, properly denied appellant's re-
strictive motion to quash service of summons. 
D. Appellant's motion was not a direct attack 
against the judgment. 
E. Appellant's restrictive motion to quash service 
of sun1mons, made after judgment, was neither 
a proper nor allowable motion. 
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A. 
The Denial by the District Court of Appellant's 
Restrictive Motion to Quash Service of 
Summons Is not a Final Judgment 
for the Purpose of Appeal. 
The right of appeal is an absolute but limited right 
guaranteed by the Constitution and Laws of the State of 
Utah, which provide: 
Article 8, Section 9, of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah: 
''From all final judgments of the district 
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to thP Su-
preme Court. • * * '' 
Section 104-41-1, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933: 
''From all final judgments of the district 
courts, except in certain cases specially provided 
for originating in city courts and in justices' 
courts, there shall be a right of appeal to the su-
. preme court. * * * Appeals shall also lie from the 
final orders and decrees of the court in the admin-
istration of decedents' estates and in cases of 
guardianship.'' 
This right of appeal exists only where expressly 
given by constitutional or statutory provision and cannot 
be extended. In the case of In re Jones' Estate, (1920) 
56 Utah 291, 190 Pac. 783, the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, speaking through Chief Justice Corfman, 
said: 
''No express provision is made in our Code of 
Civil Proce_du~e giving a right of appeal from an 
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order appointing a special administrator, nor do 
we think any such right was intended or may be 
reasonably implied from the reading of the fore-
going constitutional or statutory provisions. The 
right of appeal does not exist unless given by 
constitutional or statutory authority, expressed 
or necessarily implied. Woerner, Am. Law of 
Adm., ( 2d Ed.) Sec. 543, p. 1192; Golding v. J en-
nings, 1 Utah 135; Benson v. Anderson, 9 Utah 
15-1, 33 Pac. 691 ; In re Carpenter, 73 Cal. 203, 
14 Pac. 677. * * * To hold otherwise than that no 
appeal lies from such an appointive order would 
nullify and render ineffective the manifest intent 
and purpose of the Legislature by its enactment." 
Substantially the same holding was made by the 
Supreme Court of Utah in the following cases: Castle 
Dale City v. Woolley ( 1923), 61 Utah 291, 212 Pac. 1111; 
State v. Olsen (1911), 39 Utah 177,115 Pac. 968; State v. 
Kelsey (1924), 64 Utah 377, 231 Pac. 122. 
While the right to appeal cannot be extended beyond 
constitutional or statutory mandate, the question as to 
what are final judgments, as that term is used in the 
Constitution and Laws of the State of Utah and most 
other states, is not so well settled. In Volume 2 of 
American Jurispntdence, Pages 858, 860, 861 and 862, it 
is stated: 
''At common law error lies only from a final 
judgment. This general requirement of finality 
has been carried into the statutes regulating 
review proceedings; and it may be. stated gener-
ally that a judgment, decree, or order, to be ap-
pealable, must be final or in the nature of a final 
decision. ,... .... * 
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''A judgment, order, or decree, to be final for 
purposes of an appeal or error, must dispose of 
the cause, or a distinct branch thereof, as to all 
the parties, reserving no further questions or di-
rections for future determination. It must finally 
dispose of the whole subject-matter or be a ter-
mination of the particular proceedings or action, 
leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by exe-
cution what has been determined. In other words, 
a final judgment is one which operates to divest 
some right in such a manner as to put it beyond 
the power of the court making the order to place 
the parties in their original condition after the 
expiration of the term; that is, it must put the 
case out of court, and must be final in all matters 
within the pleadings.'' 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has at 
various times had occasion to pass upon the question as 
to what are and what are not appealable orders within 
the meaning of our Constitution and statutes. In the 
case of Shurtz v. Thorley, et al. ( 1936), 90 Utah 381, 61 
Pac. (2d) 1262, the Supreme Court of this state reviewed 
the prior decisions of the court which had defined or 
passed upon the meaning of the term ''all final judgments 
of the District Courts.'' In the course of the opinion by 
Mr. Justice Folland, it was stated: 
''After the adoption of the Constitution, this 
court defined the phrase 'final judgment' in the 
case of North Point Consolidated Irr. Co. v. Utah 
& Salt Lake Canal Co., supra, as follows (holding 
an order granting temporary injunction not a 
final judgment): 'The word "final" or "final 
judgment'' has a plain meaning. A judgment, to 
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be final, must dispose of the case as to all the 
parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter 
of the litigation on the merits of the case. Champ 
v. Kendrick, (130 Ind. 545) 30 N. E. 635. Bouvier 
defines a final judgment as used in opposition to 
interlocutory as "A final judgment is a judgment 
which ends the controversy between the parties 
litigant.'' ''The general rule recognized by the 
courts of the United States and by the courts of 
most, if not all, of the States, is that no judgment 
or decree will be regarded as final, within the 
meaning of the statutes in reference to appeals, 
unless all the issues of law and of fact necessary to 
be determined were determined and the case com-
pletely disposed of, so far as the court had power 
to dispose of it." Freem. Judgm. Sec. 34.' (Italics 
supplied.) 
"Notwithstanding what was there said about 
the words 'final judgment' having a plain mean-
ing, this court has had some difficulty in fitting the 
definition given to the varying circumstances 
shown in the many cases coming before it. The 
following orders of the district courts have been 
held not to be final or appealable judgments: 
Granting injunction pendente lite, North Point 
Consolidated Irr. Co. v. Utah & Salt Lake Canal 
Co., supra; granting motion for a new trial, East-
man v. Gurrey, supra; overruling motion for a 
new trial, White v. Pease, 15 Utah 170, 49 P. 416; 
Nelson v. Southern Pac. Co., 15 Utah 325, 49 P. 
644; appointing receiver pendente lite, Popp v. 
Daisy Gold-Min. Co., 22 Utah 457, 63 P. 185; 
United States v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
day Saints, 5 Utah 394, 16 P. 723; Oldroyd v. :Mc-
Crea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580, 588, 40 A. L. R. 230 ; 
for temporary alimony and suit money, In re 
Kelsey, 12 Utah 393, 43 P. 106; for an accounting, 
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Standard Steam Laundry v. Dole, 20 Utah 469, 
58 P. 1109 ; quashing service of summons, Honer-
ine Min. & Mill. Co. v. Tallerday Steel Pipe & 
Tank Co., 30 Utah 449, 85 P. 626; granting non-
suit where not followed by judgment of dis1nissal, 
Rocky Mountain Stud Farm Co. v. Lunt, 46 Utah 
299, 151 P. 521; verdict of jury without proper 
judgment, Kourbetis v. National Copper Bank of 
Salt Lake City, 71 Utah 232, 264 P. 724; awarding 
possession of exhibit after judgment, Omega Inv. 
Co. v. Woolley, 75 Utah 274, 284 Pac. 523. 
''The following orders or judgments have 
been held final judgments for purposes of appeal: 
Discharging petitioner of habeas corpus, Winno-
vich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988; quashing 
garnishment and releasing garnishee, Bristol v. 
Brent, 35 Utah 213, 99 P. 1000; dismissing action 
after sustaining motion for nonsuit, Robinson v. 
Salt Lake City, 37 Utah 520, 109 P. 817; 'Inter-
locutory decree' in divorce cases, Parsons v. Par-
sons, 40 Utah 602, 122 P. 907; ordering delivery 
of property and accounting for interest, Wheel-
wright v. Roman, 50 Utah 10, 165 P. 513; for con-
demnation of part only of property without as-
sessment of damages, Ketchum Coal Co. v. Pleas-
ant Valley Coal Co., 50 Utah 395, 168 P. 86, 89; 
decree of partnership, Benson v. Rozzelle, 85 Utah 
582, 39 P. (2d) 1113; dismissal of petition to set 
aside probate proceedings after discharge of ad-
Ininistrator, In re Phillips' Estate, 86 Utah 358, 
44 P. (2d) 699; decree of water rights as between 
certain parties in general water adjudication, 
Plain City Irr. Co. v. IIooper Irr. Co., 87 Utah 
545, 51 P. (2d) 1069, 1076." 
In the case of Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy 
{1937 ), 93 Utah 426, 73 Pac. (2d) 1277, the Supreme Court 
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of this state, speaking through Mr. Justice Wolfe, cited 
the above-mentioned case as the oldest case on this point 
in this jurisdiction and proceeded to quote the first cited 
paragraph as the court's definition of "final judgment." 
Another pertinent statement from this decision is as 
follows: 
''And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that 
an appeal from what constitutes a finding merely 
as compared to a judgment which actually adju-
dicates the rights of the parties is not appealable. 
Thus, an appeal from a verdict where judgment 
has not been entered. Kourbetis v. National Cop-
per Bank~ 71 Utah 232, 264 P. 724. Nor from an 
order for judgment, Ellinwood v. Bennion, 73 
Utah 563, 276 P. 159. Nor from a minute order 
dismissing appeal. Robinson v. Fillmore Commer-
cial & Sav. Bank, 61 Utah 398, 213 P. 790. Nor 
where order for but not judgment of dismissal is 
entered. Lukish v. Utah Const. Co., 46 Utah 317, 
150 P. 298; Watson v. Odell, 53 Utah 96, 176 P. 
619. Nor from an order quashing summons with-
out dismissing the action. Honerine Min. & Mill 
Co. v. Tallerday Steel Pipe & Tank Co., 30 Utah 
449, 85 P. 626. Nor from an order denying a mo-
tion to correct a judgment. Cullen v. Harris, 27 
Utah 4~ 73 P. 1048." 
A careful analysis of the cases appears to us to indi-
cate that the obvious intent of the Constitution and Laws 
of the State of Utah, cited supra, as well as the common 
law rules from which they arose, is simply that a litigant 
must exhaust his procedural remedies in a lower court 
and thereby finally dispose of the matter there before 
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requesting a review by the Supreme Court. In short, 
the lower court must have irretrievably placed the liti-
gant in a position where his only logical remedy is to 
appeal for a reversal or modification by a higher tribunal. 
Justice Wolfe, in the cited portion of the opinion in the 
Pomeroy case, quotes from the case of North Point Con-
solidated Irrigation Company v. Utah & 8. L. Canal Com-
pany (1896), 14 Utah 155, 46 Pac. 824. Particular atten-
tion is respectfully directed to that portion of the quota-
tion which reads : 
''A judgment, to be final, must dispose of the 
case as to all parties, and finally dispose of the 
subject matter of the litigation on the merits of 
the case.'' 
Certainly, an order denying the motion to quash serv-
ice of summons does not dispose of the case upon its 
merits. In the immediate controversy, the appellant was 
not left without further remedies in the district court by 
the order of the court denying his motion to quash service 
of summons. All that was necessary was that he amend 
his motion to one praying for an order vacating the 
judgment because of lack of jurisdiction or because of 
defective service. The order could have readily been 
made restrictive in that regard. It is very possible that 
the amendment could even have been effected by inter-
lineation. In any event, the further proceeding that 
could have been taken was obvious. 
Proceeding from these well settled and unquestioned 
principles, the immediate question arises-Is the denial 
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of the restrictive motion of the appellant to quash service 
of summons an appealable order1 This identical ques-
tion has been raised and considered by the supreme courts 
of other jurisdictions, and recognized legal commenta-
tors have commented on the same. 
In the case of Klepper v. Klepper (1928), 51 Nev. 
145, 271 Pac. 336, the Supreme Court of the State of 
Nevada was confronted with the following situation: 
Plaintiff instituted a suit for divorce. She filed an affi-
davit of nonresidence of the defendant and had service 
made upon him personally in a sister state. Defendant 
appeared specially and moved to quash the service on 
jurisdictional grounds. This was denied, and as defend-
ant did not plead further, judgment was taken against 
him by default. Defendant appealed and the court held: 
''Section 5329, Rev. Laws, as amended ( Stats. 
1913, p. 113), provides when an appeal may be 
taken, and no appeal can be taxen except when 
authorized by statute. Nowhere does our statute 
provide that an appeal may be taken from an 
order denying a motion to quash a summons, or 
the service thereof; hence it is clear that the 
defendant had no right of appeal from the order 
in question.'' 
This case appears to us to be even stronger than the 
one confronting this Court. The laws of Nevada provide 
that an appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken by 
the defendant as a matter of right from any judgment 
against him; from a final judgment of conviction; from 
an order denying a motion for a new trial; and from 
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an order made after judgment affecting the substantial 
rights of the party. It would seem these provisions give 
a right of appeal in situations that are not covered by the 
Utah Constitution and statutes, supra, and hence are much 
broader than our own laws. 
In the case of Ryan v. Davenport (1894), 5 S.D. 203, 
58 N. W. 568, the Supreme Court of the State of South 
Dakota considered this problem. In this case, the appeal 
was from an order of the Circuit Court denying a motion 
to set aside the service of summons as irregular and void. 
Respondent's counsel moved to dismiss the appeal from 
the court on the grounds that no appeal will lie from an 
order denying the motion to set aside the service of 
summons. The court, in upholding the position taken by 
respondent, said in the course of its opinion: 
'' 'The following orders when made by the court 
may be carried to the supreme court: 1, An order 
affecting a substantial right made in any action, 
when such order in effect determines the action 
and prevents a judgment from which an appeal 
might be taken. 2, A final order affecting a sub-
stantial right made in special proceedings, or upon 
a summary application in an action after judg-
ment. 3, * * *. 4, When it involves the merits of 
the action or some part thereof. * * *' Unless the 
order comes within one of the above provisions, 
no appeal will lie. An order setting aside the 
service of the summons would have affected a 
substantial right, as such order would, in effect, 
determine the action, and prevent a judgment 
from which an appeal might be taken. The effect 
of this order is not to determine the action and 
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prevent a judgment; nor is it in a special pro-
ceeding, nor upon a summary application in an 
action after judgment; neither does it involve the 
merits of the action, or any part thereof. Orton 
v. K oonan, 32 Wis. 104; Rahn v. Gunnison, 12 
\Vis. 528. The overruling of an objection made 
to the jurisdiction of a court, or the denial of a 
motion to set aside the service of a summons on 
jurisdictional grounds, is not a final order affect-
ing a substantial right, and is not appealable un-
der the provisions of our statute, nor reviewable 
in this court before the entry of final judgment. 
An order that involves the merits of an action is 
one that goes to its substance or subject-matter, 
and affects the justice of the cause; and it can-
not be said that the order from which this appeal 
is taken is of that character. The appeal is dis-
missed.'' 
In the case of Salmons v. Rugyeri (1927 ), 103 N. J. 
Law 596, 137 Atl. 568, the Court of Errors and Appeals 
of the State of New Jersey passed upon this question. In 
this case, the court held that an order overruling a 
motion to strike out return to summons and to quash the 
writ was not a final judgment that entitled defendant to 
appeal therefrom. The court said in this regard: 
''Here the order was simply 011e overruling 
a motion to strike out the return to· a summons 
and to quash the writ. It was a 1nere interlocutory 
order. The defendant should have filed an answer 
on the merits as directed by l\Ir. Justice Trench-
ard, and gone to trial. He had protected himself, 
upon the reeunl, as to the question which he 
raised, could have raised it again on the trial, and, 
in the event of an adverse verdict, could have ar-
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gued the invalidity of the service, as well as any 
other matter, or he could have stayed away and 
reviewed by appeal a judgment by default, which is 
what the defendant did in Pizzutti v. Wuchter." 
Bancroft, in his work on "Code Practice and Rem-
edies," Vol. 8, Page 8387, Section 6322, states : 
''Where a motion to quash the summons for 
irregularity is overruled, the case is in no sense 
finally disposed . of, and such an order is not of 
itself appealable. So, also, it has been held that 
where the summons has simply been quashed with-
out an order of dismissal, an appeal will not lie; 
but in some cases, an order quashing the summons 
has not been held to be appealable." 
In the same volume, Page 8388, Section 6323, Ban-
croft goes on to state : 
''In most jurisdictions, an order either sustain-
ing or refusing a motion to set aside service of 
summons is not appealable, regardless of whether 
the service has been made personally or by pub-
lication. An order quashing service is not a final 
judgment, but leaves the action pending with the 
right in the plaintiff to sue out an alias summons.'' 
In Brancroft's "Code Pleading Practice and Rem-
edies," Ten-Year Supplement, Vol. 5, Page 4074, Section 
6323, it is stated: 
''An order denying a motion to quash the 
summons and the service thereof is not appeal-
able. But in Washington an appeal will lie from 
an order sustaining the motion if it has the effect 
of determining the action.'' 
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Our investigation has disclosed no case in Utah pre-
cisely on this point. The Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah has, however, passed upon a situation which, in 
our opinion, substantiates the position we have taken 
as fully as if the case were directly in point. This case 
is Honerine Mining & Milling Co., et al., v. Tallerday 
Steel Pipe & Tank Co., et al., (1906 ), 30 Utah 449 
85 Pac. 626. In this case an appeal was taken from an 
order made by the district court quashing the service of 
summons. The defendant appeared specially and moved 
to quash the service upon the ground that it was not 
made upon the proper person. His motion was granted. 
On appeal the defendant argued that the order was not a 
final judgment within the meaning of the statute or the 
constitution and was, therefore, not appealable. The 
court held this point was well taken. In the course of the 
unanimous opinion of the court, written by Mr. Justice 
Straup, it was stated: 
"• • • the Utah statute gives the right of an 
appeal only from a final judgment. From what has 
been said by this court in prior cases, where the 
question as to what is a final judgment within the 
meaning of the statute was considered, this order 
cannot be regarded as a final judgment. North 
Point Irr. Co. v. Utah Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, 46 
Pac. 824; Eastman v. Gurrey, 14 Utah 169, 46 Pac. 
828; Watson v. Mayberry, 15 Utah 265, 49 Pac. 
479; Laundty Co. v. Dole, 20 Utah 469, 58 Pac. 
1109; Popp v. :\lin. Co., 22 Utah 460, 63 Pac. 185. 
* * * vVhile plaintiff is here seeking to have de-
terrnined that it has the defendant in court upon 
the process served, it may, at the same time, also 
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apply for and obtain an alias summons from the 
district court with which it may serve the defend-
ant and bring it in." 
This same contingency that was considered by Mr. 
Justice Straup in the cited case is possible in the present 
controversy. There was nothing to prevent the appel-
lant from entering a special appearance in the district 
court on a motion to vacate the judgment because of im-
proper service of summons. We submit it is an ines-
capable aphorism that if the Constitution and Laws of 
Utah do not permit an appeal from an order quashing 
a service of summons, they will not authorize an appeal 
from an order denying such a motion. 
The only question, as we interpret the situation, that 
arises i3 whether or not the fact that the restrictive 
motion of appellant to quash the service of summons 
was made after a default judgment had been entered 
should alter the well settled rule presented. We maintain 
in the present situation that this fact should not result 
in a modification of or different holding from the rule 
expressed by the cited cases and commentators. Appel-
lant has urged in his brief that his motion must be con-
sidered as one directed to the vacating of a judgment 
because of a void service of summons. We are at a com-
plete loss to understand how this position can possibly 
be taken. The motion, by its own terms, restricts its 
attack to the service of process and eliminates thereby 
any consideration of the judgment. In short, by the 
terms of the motion, both the trial court and respondent 
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were powerless to even look to the judgment but were 
forced to direct their entire attention to the alleged void 
service. vVe submit that both by common law and the 
constitutional and statutory provisions of most of the 
states, including the State of Utah, it is conclusively 
shown that the order appealed from is not an appealable 
order. 
B. 
Appellant's Restrictive Motion to Quash Service 
of Summons, Made After Judgment, 
Precluded Respondent from 
Defending Its Judgment. 
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, respondent will 
endeavor to present to the Court the impossible position 
in which it was placed by appellant's motion. 
The record, upon its face, established a valid service 
of summons. In light of this and additional facts, re-
spondent in good faith took its judgment. Appellant 
then proceeded to request relief by his restrictive mo-
tion to quash the service of summons. Appellant was 
apparently proceeding under the theory that if he could 
destroy the foundation of the judgment, to wit, the serv-
ice of summons, the judgment must fall of its own weight. 
In order to present the equities of the matter to the 
court and to defend itself against this indirect attack 
against the judgment, respondent should have been en-
titled to present any facts that would sustain its judg-
ment, even assuming appellant had been able to maintain 
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the position he had taken to the effect that at the in-
ception of the action there was a void or defective service 
of summons. The form and substance of the motion 
makes it clear that the attack was not against the judg-
ment as such, but was confined to an attack against the 
service of process. The validity or merits of the judg-
ment, or any of the facts or proceedings subsequent to 
the service of process, were not raised in the motion, the 
affidavit in support thereof, or in the oral evidence in-
troduced at the hearing. Proof of the fact that the ap-
pellant entered an appearance either in person or by 
counsel would be sufficient to sustain the judgment, even 
though no service had been made. Laches or inexcusable 
neglect on the part of the appellant in moving to set 
aside the judgment may well have justified the court in 
refusing to set the same aside. 
A few of the multitudinous cases supporting this po-
sition are as follows: Hunter v. May (1930 ), 161 Tenn. 
155,25 S. W. (2d) 580; Selmer v. Smith (1926), 285 Pa. 67~ 
131 Atl. 663; Vaughn v. Pine Creek Tungsten Company 
(1928), 89 Cal. App. 759, 265 Pac. 491. 
The form and contents of the appellant's motion ex-
pressly precluded respondent from defending its judg-
ment on any of these grounds, and, likewise, limited 
the court's consideration only to the alleged void service. 
In Volume 20 of American Juris prudence, Page 
242, Section 248, it is stated: 
"It is fundamental that evidence to be ad-
missible must relate and be confined to the matter 
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or matters in issue in the case at bar and must 
tend to prove or disprove these matters or be 
pertinent thereto, or, to put it another way, the 
proof must correspond to the issues raised by the 
pleadings. This rule excludes evidence of col-
lateral facts or those which are incapable of af-
fording any reasonable presumption or inference 
as to the principal fact or matter in dispute-
those which are remote, collateral, and irrele-
vant.'' 
At Page 278, Section 302, same authority and vol- · 
ume, it is stated: 
"The fundamental principle is that evidence 
must be relevant to the facts in issue in the case 
on trial and tend to prove or disprove such facts; 
evidence as to collateral facts is not admissible." 
It must be remembered that appellant's restrictive 
motion was directed entirely and exclusively to the al-
leged void service of summons and in no way was di-
rected to the validity of the judgment itself. It is self-
apparent that the procedure taken by appellant placed 
respondent in a position that was not only unreasonable 
but was manifestly unfair and inequitable. Appellant in 
his brief has argued that respondent permitted the appel-
lant to conclusively prove and establish that the court 
was without jurisdiction to enter its judgment. An exam-
ination of the record discloses this is not the fact. Re-
spondent objected to any testimony being offered in 
rupport of appellant's motion upon the grounds that the 
motion itself was improper and any evidence taken in 
support of the same was irrelevant and immaterial. 
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Appellant further contends that respondent did not offer 
any evidence to support the validity of its judgment. It 
appears to us rather anomalous that appellant takes this 
position, in view of the fact that by the express terms 
of his motion he precluded respondent from offering any 
such evidence. Appellant states in his brief that his 
motion was for the purpose of attacking the validity of 
the judgment to the end that the judgment would be 
declared invalid. We submit that such being the fact, 
appellant's restrictive motion to quash service of sum-
mons, made after judgment, placed respondent in an im-
possible position and one not calculated to fully and 
impartially present the pertinent facts of the controversy 
to the court. In light of this, it was not only the right 
but the duty of the trial court to deny the motion. 
c. 
The District Court, Regardless of Objections by 
Respondent, Properly Denied Appellant's 
Restrictive Motion to Quash 
Service of Summons. 
Appellant in his brief argues that the plaintiff did 
not file a reply or denial of any kind to the sworn affidavit 
of the appellant and intimates that the objections made 
by respondent were not sufficient to justify the court in 
its holding. We believe the objections made by respond-
ent, or the form thereof, are entirely immaterial. If the 
motion of the appellant to quash service of summons, 
made after judgment, was a valid and allowable motion, 
it should have been granted regardless of any objections 
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made by respondent. On the other hand, if the motion 
was not a permissible motion, the trial court should have 
denied the same regardless of objections or lack of ob-
jections on the part of respondent. To go even a step 
further, if the motion made by appellant was injudicious, 
the trial court should have denied the same even though 
its allowance was urged by both the appellant and re-
spondent. We submit that inasmuch as appellant's mo-
tion was, in light of the facts, injudicious and improper, 
the court not only had the discretion but the duty to 
deny the same. 
D .. 
Appellant's Motion Was not a Direct Attack 
Against the Judgment. 
At the outset of our presentation, in furtherance 
with Point D, we desire clearly to define our position. We 
believe appellant's motion to quash service of process, 
restricting itself to that purpose and nothing more, will 
not lie when made after judgment. We further main-
tain that the propriety of such a motion is in no way 
affected by a determination that the motion is a direct 
or collateral attack against the judgment. In any event, 
a motion, such as the one made by appellant, should not 
be granted. Appellant has, however, directed a consider-
able portion of his brief to the proposition that his motion 
was a direct attack against the judgment, as distinguished 
from a collateral attack. Assuming, without admitting, 
that the question of direct and collateral attack in relation 
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to this controversy is material, we cannot agree that this 
motion was a direct attack against the judgment. 
It is interesting to note that nowhere in the motion 
is there any reference made to the merits of the action or 
the judgment. In fact, the term ''judgment'' is not even 
used. 
To refer briefly to the record, there is nothing to indi-
cate that the service of summons was not legally and 
effectively made. It is only by evidence dehors the record 
that any contrary position can be taken. 
Many courts, including the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, have passed upon the efficacy of direct and 
collateral attacks against judgments. The holdings have 
been almost as varied as the number of courts passing 
upon this question. It is practically impossible to lay 
down any general rules or principles in regard to direct 
and collateral attacks against judgments. Some of the 
leading cases, however, in our opinion show a decided 
trend to a rule that evidence dehors the record is inad-
missible to impeach a judgment legal on its face. In this 
regard we direct the Court to Globe Construction Co. v. 
Yost ( 1932), 169 Wash. 319, 13 Pac. (2d) 433; Green v. 
Craig {1932), 164 Tenn. 445, 51 S. W. (2d) 480; Levinson 
v. Vanderveer (1932), 169 Wash. 254, 13 Pac. (2d) 448. 
Courts have many times held that final decrees and 
judgments are not open to collateral attacks. 
Fidelity Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Ford and Cantrell 
. (1931), 164 Tenn. 107,47 S. W. (2d) 558; 
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Producers' Refining Company v. Missouri K. tt T. 
R. Co. of Texas, (Tex.) 13 S. W. (2d) 679; 
Amy v. Amy (1895), 12 Utah 278, 42 Pac. 1121. 
What constitutes a collateral attack, as distinguished 
from a direct attack, is, as stated, by no means settled. 
It would seem, however, that many of the better reasoned 
cases hold that where a judgment is not void on its face, 
it is not subject to a collateral attack. 
Dockery v. Central Arizona Light & Power Com-
pany (1935), 45 Ariz. 434,45 Pac. (2d) 656; 
In re Fort Shaw Irrigation District ( 1927), 81 
~font. 170, 261 Pac. 962; 
Coburn v. Coburn (1931), 89 Mont. 386, 298 Pac. 
349; 
Bird v. Palmer (1931), 152 Olda. 3 and 7, 3 Pac. 
(2d) 890 and 894; 
Protest of St. Louis- S. F. Railway Co. (1933), 
163 Okla. 1, 19 Pac. (2d) 162; 
Wise v. Miller (1927), 215 Ala. 660, 111 So. 913; 
Florence Gin Company v. City of Florence (1933), 
226 Ala. 478, 147 So. 417; 
Lambie v. W. T. Rawleigh Company (1929 ), 178 
Ark. 1019, 14 S. W. (2d) 245. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, in the 
case of Intermill v. Nash (1938), 94 Utah 271, 75 Pac. 
(2d) 157, passed upon this question. Appellant has cited 
this case as authority for the position he has taken. We 
believe the case stands for the exact opposite of his 
position and, therefore, will endeavor to analyze the 
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decision. The facts of the case are, briefly, as follows: 
The plaintiff instituted a suit against the defendant to 
quiet her title to real estate located in Salt Lake City. 
Defendant answered, denying plaintiff's allegations, and 
in a counterclaim, alleged title in herself. Plaintiff filed 
an answer to defendant's counterclaim. The answer to 
the counterclaim alleged that plaintiff had bought the 
land in question from Hoffman Brothers, and that subse-
quent to her acquiring the land, one Lulu B. Burrows 
had brought an action in the district court against Hoff-
man and others, including the plaintiff, to foreclose a 
mortgage given by Hoffman Brothers. The plaintiff 
further alleged she was not properly served in the prior 
action as the only service made was by publication and 
there was no affidavit of jurisdictional facts authorizing 
such service of summons. Plaintiff, therefore, had de-
faulted and a judgment of foreclosure had been entered 
and a sale of the property made to Lulu B. Burrows, 
which thereby created a cloud on the plaintiff's title; the 
plaintiff, therefore, prayed the court to vacate and set 
aside the pretended judgment and thereby remove the 
said cloud upon her title. The trial court excluded any 
evidence tending to show that the service upon the plain-
tiff in the foreclosure action was bad. The court's reason 
for so holding was that the evidence constituted a col-
lateral attack against the judgment in foreclosure and 
hence was inadmissible. From this ruling plaintiff ap-
pealed. 
Mr. Justice Larson, in upholding the decision of the 
lower court to the effect that a judgment cannot be col-
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laterally attacked, even though the ground for the attack 
be a void service of process, said in the course of his 
opinion: 
''A direct attack is an action or motion for the 
specific and primary purpose of setting aside or 
annulling the judgment; and any action which has 
for its purpose the accomplishment of any other 
relief than the setting aside or modifying of the 
judgment is not a direct attack. Wayne v. Brim-
ley, 190 Ky. 488, 227 S. W. 996. When the direct 
purpose and aim of the proceeding is to attain 
relief other than the setting aside or modifying of 
the judgment, and the attack upon the judgment 
is involved merely incidentally, the attack is col-
lateral." (Italics ours.) 
It is difficult to conceive that a motion limiting itself 
to a request to quash service of summons without any 
mention or reference made to the judgment can be said 
to be ''a motion for the specific and primary purpose of 
setting aside or annulling the judgment.'' On the ques-
tion of quashing service of summons, Mr. Justice Larson 
further clarifies the position of the court when he quotes 
with approval from the case of Morrill v. Morrill ( 1890), 
20 Ore. 96, 25 Pac. 362, which held : 
" 'An attempt to impeach the decree in a proceed-
ing not instituted for the express purpose of 
annulling, correcting, or modifying the decree or 
enjoining its execution' is a collateral attack." 
(Italics ours.) 
To refer again to appellant's motion, it is apparent 
on its face that its express purpose is to quash service of 
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summons and not to vacate, annul or correct the judg-
ment. The opinion of Mr. Justice Larson goes on to 
state in regard to direct and collateral attacks: 
"The terms 'direct' and 'collateral,' as used in 
reference to attacks on judgments, apply to the 
purpose of, or the method employed in, the attack, 
and not as descriptive of the assault itself. The 
term 'direct attack' means a proceeding brought, 
instituted, or maintained directly for the purpose, 
that is, with the direct and primary objective, of 
modifying, setting aside, cancelling or vacating, 
or enjoining the enforcement of the judgment. The 
term 'collateral attack' means the questioning of 
the validity of a judgment in a collateral proceed-
ing; that is, a proceeding other than the one in 
which the judgment is entered, and which is not 
brought, instituted, or maintained for the express 
purpose of modifying, setting aside, canceling, or 
enjoining the execution of the judgment. It is a 
denial of, or questioning the validity of, a judg-
ment, when the judgment is or becomes involved in 
the cause, only incidentally and collaterally, and 
its enforcement or validity is not the primary 
issue in or purpose of the proceeding." (Italics 
ours.) 
Mr. Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion in the 
case of lntermill v. Nash, says: 
''There have been many confusing statements 
as to direct and collateral attacks on judgments. 
We are interested more in the manner of testing 
in any given case whether a judgment may be 
attacked than in nomenclature. As says the 
prevailing opinion, generally, a direct attack is one 
the. purpose of which is to eliminate what is o.r 
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purports to be a judgment, whereas a collateral 
attack atten1pts not to obliterate the judgment, but 
to avoid the effect of it when used in another suit. 
But I think there is a form of direct attack which 
really only avoids the effect of a purported judg-
ment. In order to make this more clear, I list the 
types of direct attacks as I see them: (1) That 
attack which attempts to set aside a judgment by 
a motion or proceeding brought in the same suit in 
which the judgment was rendered. (2) A separ-
ate suit brought and designed directly to set aside 
a voidable judgment or what is not a judgment 
but which purports to be one; in other words, a 
void judgment. (3) Where a party brings a suit 
or defends a suit relying for recovery or for a 
defense on what purports to be a judgment ren-
dered in another suit, the opposing party may 
show such judgment to be void.'' 
l\Ir. Justice Wolfe explains his position even more 
fully at the end of his opinion, when he states: 
"At least in this case it was necessary to go out-
side of the judgment roll by the introduction in 
evidence of an affidavit of jurisdictional facts 
claimed to be deficient in order to prove the judg-
ment void. This could not be done without such 
pleadings as would be required in an independent 
action to set the judgment aside." (Italics ours.) 
To adopt the proceeding designated by Mr. Justice 
Wolfe in his opinion, it certainly cannot be contended in 
the present controversy with any degree of logic or 
reason that a motion limiting itself to a request for the 
quashing of a service of sum1nons can be said to be ''such 
pleadings as would be required in an independent action 
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to set the judgment aside.'' An analytical examination 
of the cited case fails, in our opinion, to give any support 
to the position taken by appellant. In fact, the case clear-
ly stands for the contrary to his position. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has in 
other cases clearly held that a collateral or indirect attack 
against a judgment, fair and proper on its face, is not 
permissible. In the case of Amy v. Amy, supra, the court 
said: 
"We think that the court having found, judi-
cially that service was legally made upon the de-
fendant Butterworth, in this collateral proceed-
ing recourse could not be had to the files in the 
case, aside from the judgment roll, and that no evi-
dence would be admissible other than that con-
tained in the judgment roll dehors the recital in 
the judgment." (Italics the court's.) 
This ruling was reiterated and clearly established in 
the case of Intermill v. Nash, supra, when the court held 
at Page 278 of 94 Utah: 
''A judgment, once entered by a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, having the res and the parties 
duly brought before it as provided by law, imports 
verity, proves itself, and is invulnerable to attacks 
by any indirect assaults. It can only be questioned 
in the manner and the proceedings established by 
law. And since a judgment is established and 
proved by the record thereof, unless an inspection 
of that record establishes its invalidity, shows it to 
be void, the judgment is conclusive and may not 
be questioned collaterally by any matters dehors 
the record thereof. Amy v. Amy, 12 Utah 278, 42 
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P.1121, 112-l:; Hoagland v. Hoagland, 19 Utah 103, 
57 P. 20; Liebhart v. Lawrence, 40 Utah 243, 120 
P. 215." 
In light of the foregoing authorities, it is our position 
that appellant's motion, if it can be classified as either, 
was a collateral or indirect attack against the judgment 
and, therefore, not permissible under the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
E. 
Appellant's Restrictive Motion to Quash Service 
of Summons, Made After Judgment, Was 
Neither a Proper Nor Allowable Motion. 
Regardless of whether or not the attack attempted 
to be made by appellant was collateral or direct, the 
courts have uniformly held that such a motion as filed 
by the appellant in the present controversy is not per-
missible after judgment. 
In the case of Gregg v. Seawell (1922), 85 Okla. 88, 
204 Pac. 908, a motion to quash the service of summons 
in the action was filed on the 27th day of August, 1918, 
several days after the rendition of the judgment in the 
action. The court said : 
"The plaintiffs in error have cited no author-
ity in their brief authorizing them to move to 
quash the service of a summons after the court 
has tried the cause and rendered judg1nent. It is 
obvious that such a snmn1ary proceeding is in 
effect an attack upon the judgment of the court at 
least to the extent that the judgment adjudicated 
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that the service of the summons was regular and 
effectual to vest the court with jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the issues involved in the action. The 
plaintiffs in error in their motion to quash the 
service of summons in no way challenged the cor-
rectness of the judgment rendered in the cause 
upon any grounds. 
"We conclude that the plaintiffs in error in 
this cause cannot in a summary manner have ad-
judicated the jurisdictional facts which were ad-
judicated by the judgment of the trial court that 
entered the judgment in the original action. We 
do not want to be understood as passing upon the 
validity of the service of a summons served by 
an attorney of record in an action, as we deem it 
unnecessary in view of our conclusions herein to 
pass upon that question. We conclude that a mo-
tion to quash summons after judgment is un-
authorized by law, as such a motion is only prop-
erly filed prior to the rendition of judgment.'' 
In the case of Dannenburg v. Powers (1938), 182 
Okla. 404, 77 Pac. (2d) 1142, the same result was reached 
by the court when the plaintiff, after judgment had been 
taken against him by default and after execution was 
issued and returned ''nothing found,'' filed a motion to 
quash the service of summons. The court held: 
"We hold that a motion to quash a summons, filed 
after judgment has been rendered, is not a proper 
method of attacking the validity of the summons." 
In the case of Baldwin v. Burt (1898}, 54 Neb. 287, 
74 N. W. 594, the court held that, after the entry of a 
decree, upon the showing that no service of the summons 
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upon which the decree was based had, in fact, been made, 
it was erroneous to quash such summons upon a motion 
asking solely for that order. 
In the case of Producers' Naval Stores Company v. 
Brewton, (Ga. 1916), 90S. E. 735, the court had before it 
the question of a defective service and in the course of 
its opinion said : 
''Objections to the return of a Deputy Sheriff 
which shows legal service on a defendant must be 
raised before judgment, by a plea in abatement, 
and in connection therewith the return must be 
duly traversed, and both the Sheriff and the Dep-
uty Sheriff are necessary parties to the traverse. 
''When the record shows a valid return of 
service, and it is necessary to resort to extrinsic 
testimony to show that there has been no service, 
or that the service was for any reason invalid, the 
objection can be made only by plea in abatement 
(if before judgment), and in connection therewith 
the sheriff's return must be duly traversed.'' 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has, in 
our opi~ion, clearly intimated that the proper procedure 
for vacating or setting aside a judgment is by a motion 
to set aside and vacate the judgment. 
In the case of Madsen v. Hodson (1927 ), 69 Utah 
527, 256 Pac. 792, the court said : 
"To obtain relief against a default judgment, the 
proper practice is not by motion for a new trial, 
but by a motion to set aside and vacate the judg-
ment. Thomas v. Morris, 8 Utah 284,31 Pac. 446.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
A study of appellant's brief fails to disclose one 
authority in favor of the position he has taken. The case 
~most relied upon, and cited by appellant as the leading 
and most cited case on the question, is that of Norton v. 
Atchison, etc., Railroad Company {1893), 97 Cal. 388, 32 
Pac. 452. An examination of this case indicates, if any-
thing, that the decision is against appellant's position 
rather than in support thereof. In the Atchison case, 
after the entry of judgment, the defendant filed a motion 
to quash the service of summons to set aside and vacate 
the default of the defendant and to set aside and vacate 
the judgment which had been entered in the case in favor 
of the plaintiff. It is obvious in this case that the entire 
proceedings, including the judgment, were brought before 
the court by the motion filed by the defendant. The plain-
tiff had a right under the pleadings to defend his judg-
ment in any legitimate manner he could, independent of a 
defective service of process at the inception of the action. 
In fact, respondent's principal objection to appellant's 
motion and any evidence introduced in support thereof 
in the case at bar was due to the fact that the appellant 
failed to do the very thing that was done in the Atchison 
ease. 
Appellant also cites the case of Baldwin v. Burt, 
supra, in support of his position. Any question as to 
what this authority stands for was settled by the court 
in its own syllabus of the holding of the case. In the syl-
labus the court states: 
"After the entry of a decree, upon a showing 
that no service of the summons upon which the de-
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cree was based had in fact been n1ade, it was 
erroneous to quash such summons upon a motion 
asking solely for that order." (Italics ours.) 
\Ve respectfully submit that a reading of the author-
ities upon this question clearly indicates that the unani-
mous opinion of the courts who have passed upon the 
problem is that a motion asking solely for an order quash-
ing service of summons, after judgment, is not a permis-
sible nor allowable motion. Respondent, after a careful 
search, has been able to find not one authority to the con-
trary of this position, nor has appellant cited any in his 
brief. 
It was not the opinion of the respondent herein that, 
providing the appellant could establish that the judgment 
against him was invalid and void, he could have no relief 
therefrom. Assuming the facts as stated by the appellant, 
which, however, respondent does not admit, the Legisla-
ture of Utah has seen fit to give a fair and equitable rem-
edy. This remedy is fair to both parties to the action and 
was certainly available to the appellant at the time he 
brought his motion to quash the service of process. The 
remedy referred to is found in Section 104-14-4, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, which, among other things, pro-
vides: 
"When, from any cause, the summons in an action 
has not been personally served on the defendant, 
the court may allow, on such terms as may be just, 
such defendant or his legal representative, at anv 
time within one year after the entry of any judg-
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Inent in such action, to answer to the merits of the 
original action. Nothing but the actual, taxable 
costs of the action accruing on and after the de-
fault, not including attorneys' fees, shall be im-
posed by the court under the provisions of this 
section authorizing the imposition of terms as a 
condition upon which relief is granted.'' 
The equity of such a statute is self-evident. Assum-
ing, for the sake of argument, that, as appellant contends, 
no service was made, neither of the parties to the action 
could be injured. To further assume, for the sake of 
argument, that appellant is allowed to destroy a judg-
ment in the indirect way he has attempted, and without 
regard to the Utah statutes, the reasoning behind the 
quoted section of the statute would be circumvented. A 
plaintiff, who in good faith had taken the judgment which 
was fair and proper on its face, might be barred by the 
statute of limitations from his legal remedy when a de-
fendant saw fit to raise the objection to the service of 
summons. 
'rhe case of The Blyth ct Fargo Company v. Swenson 
{1897 ), 15 Utah 345, 49 Pac. 1027, is enlightening in re-
gard to the quoted section of the Utah statutes. In this 
case, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendants in 
their individual names on two promissory notes. Per-
sonal service was made on part of the defendants but 
there was no service on one of the defendants. One of 
the defendants moved the court to set the judgment aside. 
This motion was overruled, and the defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and re-
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manded the case with the instructions that the defend-
ant be given leave to file his answer and to try the case 
upon the issues made, and, if found for him, to set the 
judgment aside; otherwise, to permit it to remain in 
force. The court, in the course of its opinion and after 
referring to the statutes cited supra, said: 
'• The court has a reasonable discretion,-a legal 
discretion. But when the defendant was not 
served with summons before judgment, and there 
was no appearance in fact, the statute quoted gives 
hin1 a year after its entry, in all such cases, to ask 
leave to answer." 
In the case of Liebhart v. Lawrence (1911), 40 Utah 
243, 120 Pac. 215, the court held that an action in equity 
to set aside a default judgment on the ground of false 
statements as to defendant's residence, in the affidavit 
for publication, was a permissible action and a direct at-
tack on the judgment. The court held that the plaintiff's 
deceit was sufficient ground in equity to set aside the 
default judgm~nt in the suit and to permit defendant to 
answer to the merits. We present that the cited cases 
merely demonstrate the desire of the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah to construe the quoted provisions of 
Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, to mean 
that when from any cause the summons in an action has 
not been personally served on the defendant, the court 
may allow him to answer to the merits of the action. It 
is self-evident that this alleviates any hardship on either 
party. 
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Appellant in his brief cites the case of Atkinson v. 
Atkinson (1913}, 43 Utah 53, 134 Pac. 595, for the propo-
sition that this section of the statute can be circumvented, 
and if the judgment is void because of a defective service 
of process, the defendant need not answer to the merits 
in order to have the judgment set aside but may, at his 
option, have the judgment vacated without answering to 
the merits of the case. Respondent respectfully submits 
this case does not stand for that proposition. This case 
was a proceeding in equity to set aside and annul a judg-
ment or decree of divorce. The appellant brought an action 
to obtain a divorce from the respondent, who had never 
lived in Utah. The service of summons in that action was 
made by publication, the order for which was based upon 
an affidavit which stated that the respondent was a non-
resident of the State of Utah and that her last known 
address was Cleveland, Ohio. This affidavit was false 
and was known to be so by the appellant, inasmuch as 
the respondent was a resident of Bridgeport, Connecti-
cut. The trial court found it had obtained no jurisdiction 
of the person of the respondent and that the decree of 
divorce was void and the respondent was entitled to 
have the same set aside and annulled. From this decision 
appellant appealed. The Supreme Court upheld the de-
cision on the ground that the court had no right as a 
condition to the setting aside of the judgment to require 
the respondent to submit herself to the jurisdiction of the 
court for the purpose of the original action. Mr. Justice 
Frick, in the course of his opinion, stated: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
39 
.. * * * the practice is well settled that, in order 
to have the judgment set aside and the cause re-
opened, he ordinarily must submit himself to the 
jurisdiction of the court, and n1ust also set up a 
good defense to the action in the form of an affi-
davit or answer." 
)Ir. Justice Frick went on to say, however, that 
where the appellant had been guilty of fraud in inducing 
the court to assume jurisdiction, a different rule would 
prevail. He reasoned that under the circumstances of 
the particular case, the district court was right in refus-
ing to require the respondent to subject herself to the 
jurisdiction of the court in the original action as a condi-
tion to having the decree of divorce set aside. The court, 
in our opinion, based its decision in this case upon the 
proposition that it was through appellant's fraud that 
the court has assumed jurisdiction of the action and ren-
dered a judgment theron. The court further assumed 
that in some situations it might work a decided hardship 
upon the adverse party to cause him to submit himself 
to the jurisdiction of the court, which otherwise could 
not get jurisdiction over him, in order to have a void 
judgment set aside. 
In short, we do not believe the Atkinson case can be 
said to be authority for the proposition that the quoted 
portion of Section 104-14-4, Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1933, can be circumvented and nullified at the option of 
the litigant. There is nothing in the record to indicate 
that it would result in any hardship on the appellant 
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herein to request the court to reopen the case and permit 
him to answer to the merits. In the absence of such a 
showing, we do not believe the Atkinson case is authority 
for the position taken by appellant, and we respectfully 
submit that appellant had a clear and equitable remedy 
at the time he filed the motion which is the subject of this 
controversy. We further submit that under the facts 
and circumstances of this case, the remedy provided for 
by the cited portion of Section 104-14-4 was the exclusive 
remedy. 
Summary 
It has been the purpose of respondent in this brief 
to present to this Court its position that the denial of a 
restrictive motion to quash service of summons, made 
after judgment, is not an appealable order, inasmuch as 
said order is not a final judgment as that term is used in 
the Constitution and Statutes of the State of Utah. It 
has further been our purpose to demonstrate that appel-
lant's motion was one which if granted would not have 
served the ends of justice but would have defeated and 
circumvented the same. We have further presented that 
reason, equity and authority are unanimous in requiring 
a holding that a restrictive motion to quash service of 
summons, made after judgment, is not a proper or allow-
able motion. 
The arguments in respondent's brief not directed to 
the foregoing propositions have been made merely in 
refutation of contentions of appellant in his brief. 
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Upon the foregoing propositions, respondent main-
tains that the trial court ruled correctly in denying ap-
pellant's restrictive motion to quash service of sum-
mon made after judgment. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GRANT A. BROWN, 
ALVIN I. SMITH, 
GARFIELD 0. ANDERSON, 
RICHARD L. BIRD, JR., 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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